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I. INTRODUCTION
The wave of teachers’ strikes that began in the spring of 
2018 and have continued into 20191 is one of the most 
impressive examples of labor militancy in at least the past half 
century. The strikes are remarkable in their number, coming as 
they do in a period of declining strike rates in the U.S.2 They are 
stunning in their level of success, especially compared to the 
results of other famous strikes by public-sector unions such as 
the PATCO strike of the 1981, the New York Transit Workers of 
2005, and the Hortonville teachers’ strike of 1974.3 And they are 
fascinating in that the spring 2018 strikes took place in states 
which not only barred strikes by any public employees, but also 
did not authorize collective bargaining for any public 
employees.4
Successful teacher union activism is not new. In 1916, 
Fursman v. Chicago5 upheld a rule that barred Chicago teachers 
from membership in the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT).6 Yet after several years of political activism, the AFT was 
able to get the rule repealed.7 Throughout the twentieth 
century, both the AFT and the National Education Association 
1. Since the strikes of spring 2018 that are the main subject of this essay, charter 
school teachers in Chicago and Parma, Ohio have gone on a successful strikes, as 
have public-school teachers in Los Angeles.  See Jennifer Medina & Dana Goldstein, 
Success of Los Angeles Teachers Strike Rocks Charter Schools, and a Rich Supporter,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/us/charter-schools-
los-angeles.html; Patrick O’Donnell, Teachers OK Contract to End Strike at Summit 
Academy Charter School in Parma, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (March 1, 2019), 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2019/03/teachers-ok-contract-to-end-strike-at-
summit-academy-charter-school-in-parma.html. 
2. Abigail Abrams, The Number of U.S. Workers Involved in a Strike in 2018 Was the 
Highest Since 1986, TIME (Feb. 8, 2019), http://time.com/5525512/american-workers-
strikes-bureau-labor-statistics/. 
3. See infra for discussions of these strikes. 
4. The strikes took place in Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
and West Virginia. Abrams, supra note 2. None of these states grant collective 
bargaining rights to teachers. RICHARD KEARNEY & PATRICE MARESCHAL, LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 64-65 (5th ed. 2014). Strikes by any public 
employee are illegal in almost all these states. Id. at 245-46. 
5. Fursman v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917) (reasoning the Chicago 
School Board had the right to decline to employ or re-employ any applicant for any 
reason whatever or for no reason at all). 
6. Id. at 325–26, 116 N.E. at 160. 
7. JOSEPH SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,
AND THE STATE, 1900-1962 41 (2004). 
2019] TEACHERS’ STRIKE OF 2018  193 
(NEA) represented teachers in a variety of ways: lobbying for 
civil service and tenure laws; representing teachers under such 
laws; forging informal agreements with employers over wages, 
hours, and working conditions; and, in the later decades of the 
twentieth century, engaging in formal collective bargaining and 
even striking.8
These activities are, of course, what unions are known for.  
Crucially, though, teachers’ unions have engaged in these 
activities under the umbrella of public-sector labor laws, laws 
that have always been significantly more restrictive than the 
laws that govern unions in the private sector.  Most private-
sector workers are governed by the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)9 or the Railway Labor Act (RLA).10 These federal 
statutes, passed in 1935 and 1926 respectively, provide, at least 
on paper, a relatively robust right to bargain collectively and to 
strike.11 Public-sector labor law, however, is generally a matter 
of state or even local government law. While public-sector laws 
vary tremendously, a clear majority of them bar strikes by all 
public employees.12  A significant minority of states do not even 
authorize collective bargaining by most or even any public 
employees.13  Public-sector laws were also enacted significantly 
later than private-sector laws. The first public-sector laws were 
enacted in the 1960s, and a number were enacted in the 1980s or 
later.14 Further, in the twenty-first century, laws granting rights 
to public-sector unions have been under attack. These attacks 
include, but are not limited to, Act 10 in Wisconsin (practically 
eliminating collective bargaining rights for all public employees 
not in “protective services);15 a similar repeal of rights in Iowa;16
and the Janus decision,17 which held that any union security 
8. See SLATER, supra note 7, at 39-96. 
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2019). 
10. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq (2019).
11. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935); Railway 
Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926). 
12. See generally SETH HARRIS ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND 
PUBLIC SECTORS 811 (2d ed. 2016). 
13. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 64-65. Strikes by any public employee 
are illegal in all these states.  Id. at 245-46. 
14. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 55. 
15. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 73-75. 
16. In 2017, Iowa enacted House File 291, which is largely modeled after Wisconsin 
Act 10. H.F. 291, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ia. 2017) (enacted), 
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ba=HF291&ga=87.   
17. Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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clause that obligated a member of a union bargaining unit to pay 
any dues to help defray representation costs the union was 
obligated to provide violated the First Amendment.18
In this climate, teachers struck in states where they had no 
right to bargain collectively, much less strike. The relevant 
government employers and officials had no obligation to engage 
in any negotiations with them, and indeed could have fired all of 
them for striking.19 That they actually gave in to teacher 
demands and did not fire anyone demonstrates that practical 
realities may outweigh legal rights in some labor relations.  Still, 
illegal strikes remain fraught with risks for employees, and one 
can simultaneously admire the teachers’ organizational skills 
and victories while wondering if periodic illegal wide-spread 
work stoppages are the optimal way to conduct labor relations 
on an ongoing basis. 
This essay addresses the historical context of these strikes.  
First, it describes the historical background and evolution of the 
wildly inconsistent and often woefully inadequate public-sector 
labor laws in the U.S.  It will describe how this regime evolved 
so differently than private-sector labor law in the U.S., and 
indeed differently than laws governing public-sector workers in 
comparable countries, where bargaining and strike rights for 
teachers are much more common.20 Second, it gives some 
examples of how teachers’ unions have dealt with severe legal 
restrictions on their activities in the past: sometimes not as 
successfully as recently. Finally, it will consider the 
consequences of the current legal regime for unions, employees, 
and employers going forward. 
18. Id. at 2460. 
19. See Steven Greenhouse, Making Teachers’ Strikes Illegal Won’t Stop Them, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/opinion/teacher-strikes-
illegal-arizona-carolina.html. 
20. See generally REGULATING STRIKES IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES: A COMPARATIVE ‘LAW
IN ACTION’ PERSPECTIVE (Moti Mironi & Monika Schlachter, eds., 2019) (covering 
relevant laws in the U.S. and thirteen other countries) [hereinafter REGULATING 
STRIKES]. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHTS TO BARGAIN AND STRIKE IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR
A. The Pre-Collective Bargaining Era 
Strikes by public employees were illegal everywhere in the 
U.S. until the 1970s, when a few states authorized them in 
limited circumstances.21  Even today, only a dozen states make 
any strikes by any type of public employee legal in any 
circumstances.22 On the other hand, a majority of states 
currently authorize some form of collective bargaining for at 
least some public employees, including teachers.23 Thus, in a 
majority of states, teachers (and other public employees) have a 
legal right to bargain collectively, but no legal right to strike. 
Instead, public-sector labor laws contain various, but at least 
somewhat standardized, alternative methods for resolving 
bargaining impasses, using combinations of mediation, “fact-
finding” and various types of interest arbitration.24 But even 
today, eight U.S. states do not permit any public employees to 
bargain collectively, and around a dozen more only let one-to-
four categories of public employees bargain collectively.25
This is not “natural,” in that most other first world 
countries have much more robust bargaining and strike rights 
for teachers and most other public employees.26 Why did labor 
laws governing public employees develop so differently in the 
U.S. than elsewhere, with legal rights for public-sector unions 
coming much later and often in a much more limited fashion 
than rights for private-sector employees? 
The first reason is the Boston police strike of 1919.27  While 
public workers had no rights to organize or bargain, much less 
strike, at that time, some government employees had organized 
into unions as early as the 1830s.28  By the second decade of the 
21. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941. 
22. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 245-46. 
23. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 64-65. 
24. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891-940. 
25. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 65-66, 245-46, 269-70. 
26. See Joseph Slater, United States, in REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 477-
513. 
27. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 479-80; see generally SLATER, supra note 
4, at 13-38. 
28. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 479-80. 
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twentieth century, levels of public-sector unionization were 
starting to rise.29 Several major public-sector unions (including 
but not limited to the American Federation of Teachers) formed 
and/or affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL).  
In 1919, the AFL began chartering police unions; this prompted 
intense opposition from public and private employers.30 After 
Boston police officers formed an AFL-affiliated union, the local 
police commissioner barred such affiliation.31 Police union 
leaders refused to leave the AFL; the commissioner suspended 
several of them; and in response, almost all police officers in 
Boston went on an illegal strike in September 1919.32  For a few 
days, Boston suffered lawlessness and some deaths related to 
the strike.33
The aftermath of the strike hurt public-sector unions for 
decades.  Many local governments barred any public employees 
from affiliating with the AFL.34  For example, Seattle required 
public-school teachers to sign “yellow dog”35 contracts stating the 
teacher would not join a union while employed as a teacher.36
Courts upheld such bans until the late 1960s.37 The union 
density rate in the public sector fell in the 1920s, and for many 
decades to come, union opponents invoked the Boston strike to 
oppose any proposal that any type of public employee should 
have the right to bargain collectively.38
Apart from the Boston strike, Constitutional law and the 
highly subdivided nature of government in the U.S. helped 
prevent public employees from winning bargaining and strike 
rights. First, in the New Deal era and beyond, the Tenth  
29. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 479-80. 
30. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480. 
31. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480. 
32. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480. 
33. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480; see also SLATER, supra note 7, at 13-
38. 
34. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480; see also SLATER, supra note 7, at 35-
38. 
35. Yellow dog contracts seek to reduce labor union participation by asking 
employees not to join a union or to resign if they are already a member. Yellow Dog 
Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
36. SLATER, supra note 7, at 39-70. 
37. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 58-63. See, e.g., AFSCME Local 201 v. City of 
Muskegon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197 (1963) (upholding bar on police affiliating 
with the AFL). 
38. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480; see also SLATER, supra note 7, at 13-
38. 
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Amendment would have been a significant obstacle to a federal 
law regulating the labor relations of states and their 
subdivisions.  It was not until the 1980s that the Supreme Court 
held that the Tenth Amendment did not bar application of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act to states and their subdivisions.39
Further, counties, cities, and even political subdivisions of cities 
such as school boards, had significant political independence, 
and political leaders of such entities, e.g. school boards, opposed 
giving their employees collective bargaining rights.40
With no statutes giving rights to public-sector unions, state 
courts made the “common law” of public-sector labor law, and 
these courts were quite deferential to arguments public officials 
made that unionization of their workers was harmful.  Also, in 
the mid-20th century, some courts relied on the “non-delegation 
doctrine”41 to hold that even voluntary collective bargaining by 
public employers was an unconstitutional delegation of public 
power (e.g., to set wages of public employees) to a private party 
(a union).42
Further, even though after the Boston police strike through 
the early1960s, public-sector unions effectively renounced the 
strike weapon, judges still routinely upheld bars on public-sector 
workers merely belonging to unions, reasoning that membership 
would inevitably lead to strikes. Judges could not conceive of 
labor relations that did not involve strikes. The fact that public-
sector unions from the 1920s through the 1950s rarely actually 
struck did not matter.43
B. The Era of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
 Begins in the 1960s 
The first public-sector labor law was passed in Wisconsin in 
39. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
40. See generally Joseph Slater, United States, in REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 
20. 
41. “The non-delegation doctrine is a principle in administrative law that Congress 
cannot delegate its legislative powers to other entities. This prohibition typically 
involves Congress delegating its powers to administrative agencies or to private 
organizations.” Nondelegation Doctrine, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nondelegation_doctrine (last visited June 6, 2019). 
42. SLATER, supra note 7, at 71-96. 
43. See generally Joseph Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor Union is”: 
How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)Constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor 
Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981 (2000). 
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1959, and then amended in 1962.44  This event is also important 
because of how it dealt with the strike issue.  Proponents of 
public-sector collective bargaining in Wisconsin began 
attempting to pass such a law in 1951, but progress stalled, 
often over a question that remains central in current public-
sector labor law.  Assuming public-sector unions are not allowed 
to strike, how can bargaining impasses be resolved? The 
Wisconsin law finally passed with forms of mediation 
substituted for strikes.45  In subsequent decades, states would 
develop further alternatives to resolve bargaining impasses, 
notably “fact-finding” and “interest arbitration,” discussed below. 
The Wisconsin law was the beginning of a national trend. 
Federal employees won a limited right to bargain collectively in 
1962, when President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988.46
By 1966, sixteen states had enacted laws granting organizing 
and bargaining rights to at least some public workers.47 By the 
end of the 1970s, a majority of states had adopted such laws. 
Public-sector unionization increased rapidly as well.48 In 1955, 
all the public-sector unions put together had a combined 
membership of around 400,000; by the 1970s, the total was more 
than 4,000,000.49  By 1975, the union density rate in the public 
sector equaled that of the private sector (around 25 percent).50
The public-sector rate then increased to about 38 percent in 
1979, and has stayed around that level ever since.51
Also, in the late 1960s, courts held for the first time that the 
First Amendment prevents a public employer from firing or 
otherwise discriminating against a public employee because of 
union activities.52 This was a major departure from cases in the 
first half of the twentieth century, and it put an end to “yellow 
44. See SLATER, supra note 7, at 158-92; see generally Paul Moreno, The History of 
Public-Sector Unionism (2011) (Hillsdale College), https://www.hillsdale.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/FMF-2011-The-History-of-Public-Sector-Unionism.pdf. 
45. For more details on this, see SLATER, supra note 7, at 158-92. 
46. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1962). 
47. SLATER, supra note 7, at 191. 
48. SLATER, supra note 7, at 191-93. 
49. SLATER, supra note 7, at 193; see AFSCME: 75 Years of History,
https://www.afscme.org/union/history/afscme-75-years-of-history (last visited June 6, 
2019). 
50. Henry Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence Between 
the Public and Private Sectors, Working Paper #503, Princeton University Industrial 
Relations Section (2005), http://harris.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/503.pdf. 
51. Id.
52. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 65. 
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dog” contracts and other bans on union membership in the 
public sector that were common through the early 1960s.  
However, this constitutional right has never included the right 
to bargain collectively or the right to strike.53
The 1960s and 1970s was a period of relative militancy for 
many public-sector unions, especially teachers (although nothing 
approaching the rate of strikes in the private sector in that era). 
The 1980s and beyond has seen a steep decline in public-sector 
strike rates.54 For example, there were many more strikes in the 
public sector in the state of Ohio in the period of 1974-79 (282) 
than in the longer period of 1984-1992 (110).55 The even longer 
period of 2000-10 saw even fewer strikes (43).56 Significantly, the 
low strike rates in the public sector persisted even in states 
which made strikes by most public employees legal, such as 
Ohio.57 This is due in large part to the alternative impasse 
resolution mechanisms discussed further below. 
Before the teachers’ strikes of 2018, the most famous strike 
by public workers in the 1980s and after was conducted by 
federal air traffic controllers (PATCO, the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Union) in 1981.58 That strike was soundly 
defeated.  PATCO was decertified, all the strikers lost their jobs, 
and some were actually jailed under provisions of federal law 
which make strikes against the federal government a crime.59
Public transport workers struck in New York City in 2005, and 
that strike also did not end well for the union, featuring, among 
other things, an injunction, crippling fines, and a forfeiture of 
the right to use dues check-off.60
In sum, today, states use one of three models for public 
employees such as teachers: (a) such employees have no legal 
53. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 65-71. 
54. MARTIN MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 367 
(3d ed. 2016). 
55. Joseph Slater, The Rise and Fall of SB-5: The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in 
Historical and Political Context, 43 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 473, 480-81 (2012). 
56. Id. While Ohio is one of the states that permit some public employees to strike, 
that rule was not enacted until 1983, so the public-sector strike rate in that state 
was highest when all such strikes were illegal. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Greenhouse, supra note 19. 
59. For a detailed description of this strike, see JOSEPH MCCARTIN, COLLISION 
COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT 
CHANGED AMERICA (2011). 
60. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 874-84 (collecting cases). 
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right to bargain or strike (a minority approach); (b) such 
employees have a right to bargain, and some have a legal right 
to strike (another minority approach); and (c) such employees 
have a right to bargain collectively but no right to strike (the 
plurality approach). 
This legal structure is unusual. The U.S. does not follow 
international law or practices regarding strike rights or 
collective bargaining rights for public workers.61 Indeed, in 2007, 
in response to a complaint by a union, the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) called on North Carolina to repeal its 
statutory ban on all collective bargaining in the public sector in 
that state.62
Further, again, all the states in which teachers struck in 
the spring of 2018 were states in which teachers had neither the 
right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively. This is a 
minority approach today, and in some ways, it was as if these 
strikes had taken place in the past. 
III. TEACHER STRIKES IN THE PAST
For most of the period after the Boston police strike until 
the 1960s, teachers and other public employees generally 
refrained from striking.63  This does not mean teachers’ unions 
were inactive. For example, the relatively large Chicago 
Teachers Union in this era fought for civil service rules and 
against patronage, engaged in political activities, and won one of 
the first teacher salary schedules not segregated by sex.64 This 
was typical for public-sector unions in this era.65
There were some teacher strikes in this period, mostly in 
the 1940s. Teachers struck in twelve states in 1943 (winning 
61. For descriptions of legal rules and practices in a variety of other countries, see
REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20. 
62. MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 418-19; see generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
OFFICE, REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (2007), 
http://southernworker.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/ILO-Decision-on-
US-and-North-Carolina.pdf containing the decision in Case No. 2460, Complaint 
against the Government of the United States by the United Electrical, Radio, and 
Machine Workers 
63. SLATER, supra note 7, at 71-96. 
64. Slater, supra note 7, at 41; see also John LYONS, TEACHERS AND REFORM:
CHICAGO PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1929-70 (2008). 
65. SLATER, supra note 7, at 41, 71-96. 
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significant salary increases).66 In 1946, teachers in Norwalk, 
Connecticut, St. Paul, Minnesota, and New Jersey successfully 
struck.67 Teachers also struck successfully in Buffalo in 1946-
47;68 in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Jersey City in 1948,69
and in Providence, Rhode Island in 1950.70 In the 1950s, 
however, teacher militancy was rare, outside New Jersey which 
saw nine strikes in that decade.71
The 1960s and 1970s, however, saw an explosion of 
teachers’ strikes, mostly involving teachers affiliated with the 
AFT seeking recognition and labor contracts.  New York City 
teachers, led by future AFT president Albert Shanker, engaged 
in a successful one-day strike in 1960.72 In 1964, 300 AFT 
members in Louisville struck for higher pay.73  In 1965, a third 
of the teachers in South Bend, Indiana struck for four days.74
There were approximately 300 teachers’ strikes in the 1960s, 
including more than 100 in 1967 alone.75 These strikes were 
typically short: usually less than a week.76 Pittsburgh teachers 
held an eleven-day strike in 1968.77  Perhaps most famously, the 
United Federation of Teachers strike involving the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville neighborhoods in Brooklyn created tensions 
between labor and civil rights groups.78 In the 1975-76 school 
66. The Morning Delivery, A Brief History of Teacher Strikes in the United States







72. JON SHELTON, TEACHER STRIKE!: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW 
AMERICAN POLITICAL ORDER 33 (2017). 
73. Id. at 34. 
74. Id. 
75. Jon Shelton, Red State Strikes and the Roots of Teacher Militancy, Labor and 
Working-Class History Association Newsletter 7 (Dec. 2018) [hereinafter Red State 
Strikes]; see also SHELTON, supra note 72, at 35. 
76. Red State Strikes, supra note 54, at 7.  For more details, see SHELTON, supra note 
72, at 33-48. 
77. For more details, see SHELTON, supra note 72, at 38-43. 
78. See generally DENNIS GAFFNEY, TEACHERS UNITED: THE RISE OF NEW YORK 
STATE UNITED TEACHERS (2007); JERALD E. PODAIR, THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED 
NEW YORK: BLACKS, WHITES, AND THE OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE CRISIS (2002); See 
also Dana Goldstein, The Tough Lessons of the 1968 Teacher Strikes, THE NATION
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/tough-lessons-1968-teacher-
strikes/.
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year, there were over 200 teachers’ strikes, including an illegal 
week-long strike in New York City protesting cuts in education 
funding.79 The length of strikes increased in the 1970s.80 For 
example, teachers in Newark struck for a month in 1970 and for 
three months in 1971.81 In the 1972-73 school year, teachers in 
Philadelphia struck for nearly three months.82 In 1979, St. Louis 
teachers struck for six weeks.83
The vast majority of these strikes were illegal.84 Vermont 
had given municipal employees a limited right to strike in 1967, 
but beyond that, public employees, including teachers, had no 
legal right to strike in the 1960s.85 In the 1970s, a few states 
legalized strikes.  Pennsylvania granted a limited strike right to 
teachers and some other public employees in 1970.86  Hawaii and 
Minnesota followed suit in 1970 and 1975, respectively.87 In the 
1980s, a few other states granted the right to strike, including 
Illinois and Ohio, both in 1983.88 In the vast majority of states, 
however, teacher strikes remain illegal through today. Limited 
legal strike rights also did not guarantee success. In 1975-76, 
teachers struck in Pittsburgh, but that act was controversial, 
and the union did not achieve its goals.89
From the 1980s until 2018, teachers struck much less 
frequently.90 By the first decade of the 21st century, there were 
only about a dozen teachers’ strikes per year.91 This is consistent 
with a general and precipitous drop in strike rates in the U.S. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics lists the number of strikes in the 
U.S. that involved at least 1,000 workers.92 In 1967, there were 
79. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7. 
80. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7. 
81. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7. 
82. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7. 
83.Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7. 
84. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941. 
85. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941. 
86. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941. 
87. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941. 
88. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941. 
89. For more details and debate regarding the strike, see SHELTON, supra note 72, at 
143-59. 
90. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 8. 
91. Red State Strikes, supra noter 75, at 8. 
92. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 1: Work stoppages involving 1,000 or 
more workers, 1947-2017 (Feb. 9,  2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t01.htm 
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381 such strikes;93 in 1977, there were 298;94 in 1987, there were 
46;95 in 1997, there were 29;96 in 2007, there were 21;97 and in 
2017, there were 7.98
IV. THE 2018 STRIKES IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN PUBLIC 
SECTOR LABOR LAW
While the teachers’ strikes of 2018 took place under legal 
regimes more common in the first half of the 20th century, there 
were very modern reasons for the strikes. Total state and local 
funding to public education was lower in 2017 than in 2008 in 
thirty-six states;99 220,000 education jobs were cut in this period 
even as enrollments grew by over 1,000,000.100 More specifically, 
funding for K-12 education on a per-pupil basis, adjusted for 
inflation, from 2008-17 dropped 26.91% in Oklahoma,101 13.11% 
in Kentucky,102 12.76% in Arizona,103 9.9% in North Carolina,104
and 9.5% in West Virginia.105
While these cuts represent politics and priorities beyond 
labor law, it is useful to consider the alternatives labor law has 
created to deal with workplace issues. Because while some of the 
strikes described above ended relatively positively for the union, 
a number of illegal strikes ended very badly for unions and the 
communities they were in. For example, in 1971, in Reese, 
Michigan, teachers struck and the school district fired all forty-







99. Joseph McCartin, Introduction, 15(4) LABOR: STUDIES IN WORKING CLASS 
HISTORY 93, 94 (2018). 
100. Id.
101. Michael Leachman, State K-12 Funding Still Lacking in Many States, CTR. ON 
BUDGET AND POL. PRIORITIES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/state-k-12-
funding-still-lagging-in-many-states (click on Oklahoma in interactive map to display 
percentages). 
102. Id. (click on Kentucky in the interactive map to display percentages). 
103. Id. (click on Arizona in the interactive map to display percentages). 
104. Id. (click on North Carolina in the interactive map to display percentages). 
105. Id. (click on West Virginia in the interactive map to display percentages). 
106. Emily Lawler, ‘Illegal’ teacher strikes common in Michigan long before Detroit 
Public Schools sick-outs, MICHIGAN NEWS (Jan. 25,  2016), 
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the Crestwood School District fired 184 teachers for striking 
illegally.107 The teachers challenged their discharge before the 
Michigan Supreme Court, and lost.108 In 1974-75, teachers in 
Hortonville, Wisconsin engaged in one of the bitterest strikes in 
that state’s history.109 An estimated 240 replacement teachers 
were used, the strike was defeated, and nearly all the striking 
teachers lost their jobs.110 The workers appealed their case to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on due process grounds, but lost there as 
well.111 Unsuccessful illegal strikes by public workers are not 
limited to teachers, as the experiences of PATCO in 1981 and 
the New York City Transit Workers in 2005 demonstrate.112
In this regard, it is useful to review how states which 
permit collective bargaining deal with teachers’ strikes. 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO STRIKES IN MODERN U.S. PUBLIC 
SECTOR LABOR LAW
Most states that permit public employees to bargain 
collectively have alternatives to strikes to resolve bargaining 
impasses. These procedures “typically involve [some combination 
of] mediation, fact-finding, and/or interest arbitration.”113
Mediation involves a neutral third party, with no power to 
impose contract terms, meeting with the union and employer to 
try to facilitate an agreement.114 Mediation is non-binding and is 
typically most effective when there are other binding procedures 
that follow if mediation is not successful.115
Fact-finding involves a neutral party (or panel) that, 
literally, finds facts relevant to the bargaining impasse and 
makes non-binding recommendations, based on those facts and 
https://www.mlive.com/news/2016/01/illegal_teacher_strikes_common.html.
107. Id.
108. See Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 227 N.W.2d 736, 738-40 
(Mich. 1975). 




112. See Greenhouse, supra note 19; see also James G. Pope et al., The Right to 
Strike, BOSTON REVIEW (May 22, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/forum/james-gray-
pope-ed-bruno-peter-kellman-right-strike. 
113. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891. 
114. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891. 
115. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892. 
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statutory criteria.116 The process gives the parties additional 
information and a more realistic view of their chances at an 
interest arbitration that often could follow fact-finding.117 The 
statutory criteria fact-finders use are typically the same as those 
interest arbitrators must use.118 The most common and usually 
most important factors are analyzing comparable employees, the 
employer’s ability to pay, the interest of the public, and past 
labor contracts.119 The fact-finder’s recommendations are not 
binding, but they can be very influential.120  First, if the process 
moves beyond fact-finding to interest arbitration, the fact-
finder’s report and recommendations may be used as evidence in 
the arbitration hearing.121 Second, some statutes make it 
relatively difficult for parties to reject a fact-finders’ 
recommendations.122
Interest arbitration is the most common “last resort” 
mechanism to settle bargaining impasses in public-sector law.123
It involves a neutral arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, holding 
hearings, evaluating relevant evidence, and making decisions 
that are usually, but not always binding, based on the evidence 
and the criteria the public-sector statute describes.124 The 
arbitration only applies to whatever issues remain at impasse 
after negotiations and previous steps of the impasse resolution 
process have ended.125
Some states end their impasse dispute procedures without 
any arbitration or binding decision. For example, Florida, 
Kansas, and Kentucky use only mediation and fact-finding.126
Georgia uses only mediation.127
116. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892. 
117. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892. 
118. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 893. 
119. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 893. 
120. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892. 
121. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 897. 
122. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 896-97.
123. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 897. 
124. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 897. 
125. SEE HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891-97. 
126. KEARNEY AND MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 269. 
127. Id.
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VI. REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES
Whether or not the state allows any public-sector employees 
to strike under any circumstances, state laws routinely contain 
sanctions against illegal strikes.  The law on the books regarding 
illegal strikes is often quite harsh. There are two main types of 
remedies for illegal strikes: penalties against individual strikers 
and penalties against unions.128 At the most severe end of the 
scale, the law governing federal employees makes it a crime to 
strike,129 and a number of the PATCO strikers in 1981 were 
prosecuted criminally.130 While this is a minority approach, all 
the PATCO strikers were also fired and the union PATCO was 
decertified.131 Fines against unions and individual workers for 
illegal strikes are common, and courts routinely enjoin illegal 
strikes.132
A. Remedies Against Individual Strikers 
The main penalties against individual employees who strike 
illegally are usually fines, discipline (up to and including 
discharge), and limits on future public employment.133 Ohio’s 
law, for example, authorizes this type of discipline and fines of 
up to two days’ pay for each day on an illegal strike.134 It also 
provides that the employee’s compensation may not be increased 
until at least a year after the strike. 135 Other state laws provide 
similar penalties, with a few variations. Some states penalize 
one day’s wages instead of two,136 while New York’s law requires 
fines equal to twice the strikers’ daily rate of pay for each day on 
strike in all cases.137
As the teachers’ strikes of 2018 showed, public employers do 
128. See generally MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 767-77 (discussing penalties for 
illegaly striking employees and unions striking illegally). 
129. See MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 767. 
130. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 885. 
131. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 885. 
132. See discussion infra Part V.A. and Part V.B. 
133. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §210(f) (LexisNexis 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§4117.23 (West 2018); see also Malin et al., supra note 54, at 767-68. 
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.23. 
135. Id. 
136. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1316(b) (2019) 
137. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §210(f). 
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not always exercise their authority to fire illegal strikers.138
Employers have both practical and political concerns, especially 
if they wish to fire most or all teachers in a school district or 
even state. Thus, when nearly all the public-school teachers in 
West Virginia went on a (clearly illegal) strike, they were not 
fired; in fact, they won a raise.139
Still, employers have exercised this power specifically 
against teachers, and courts have given them wide discretion in 
so doing. In Hortonville Joint School District v. Hortonville 
Education Association140, the Supreme Court upheld the 
discharge of a large number of teachers who struck illegally.141
The Court rejected a challenge under the Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution.142
B. Remedies Against Unions 
Employers typically file for injunctions against illegal 
strikes, and, assuming the strike is illegal, courts routinely 
grant them.143  While injunctions are equitable remedies, many 
public-sector labor statutes specify that injunctions are available 
to employers faced with an illegal strike.144 Public employers 
seek such injunctions because they are the quickest way to end a 
strike, before the normal procedures of civil litigation are 
exhausted. A few cases have allowed unions to use an “unclean 
hands” defense to an injunction action, if the employer provoked 
the strike by failing to bargain in good faith.145  But few, if any, 
138. See, e.g. Ron Allen & Ethan Sacks, West Virginia teachers strike ends after 
governor approves raises, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/west-virginia-teachers-strike-state-
lawmakers-reach-deal-pay-raise-n854021; Michelle Goldberg, The Teacher’s Revolt in 
West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/opinion/west-virginia-teachers-strike.html;. 
139. Allen & Sacks, supra note 138; see also Goldberg, supra note 138. 
140. Hortonvile Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482 
(1976). 
141. Id. at 497. 
142. Id.
143. See MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 765-66 (discussing the “common availability 
of injunctive relief” against illegally striking employees). 
144. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1323 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§423.202a(9) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 111.70(7m)(a) (2019). 
145. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass’n, 567 P.2d 
830, 835 (1977); School Dist. For City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass’n, 157 N.W.2d 
206, 211 (1968). 
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jurisdictions follow that approach today.146
If a union continues to strike after a court issues an 
injunction ordering the strike to cease, the union is subject to 
contempt sanctions.147 Contempt can be civil, with penalties of 
fines and in some cases it may be criminal, resulting in 
additional fines and possible jail sentences for at least union 
officials.148
A common rule that can affect teachers’ strikes is that, even 
in states that permit some public employees to strike, strikes 
which begin as legal strikes may be enjoined if, at some point 
during the strike, the strike threatens the health, safety, and/or 
welfare of the public.149 For example, the Ohio statute provides 
that if “the public employer believes that a lawful strike creates 
clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public,” it 
may seek to have the strike enjoined.150 If the labor board and 
court agree to the injunction, the parties will also be ordered to 
resume bargaining with a mediator.151
These cases are often difficult for labor boards and courts 
because of the obvious tension: strikes are meant to cause some
dislocations and inconveniences, so at what point does an 
otherwise legal strike create the types of problems that threaten 
the health, safety, or welfare of the public? In Armstrong School 
District v. Armstrong Education Association152 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court revsersed the appeallate court’s order and 
effectively held that cancellation of extracurricular activities, 
community unrest, and loss of state subsidies if twelve 
instructional days lost because of a strike could not be made up 
in thirty-nine remaining days did not justify enjoining a strike 
that was legal at its inception.153 In contrast, Jersey Shore 
146. In Michigan, a 1994 amendment to the relevant state statute essentially 
overruled the Holland case. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §423.202a(9). 
147. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 874. 
148. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 874; see also, e.g., New York City Transit 
Auth. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 822 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581-82 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2006) (illustrating fines as a contempt sanction against union). 
149. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(A) (West 2018); 43 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003 (West 2019). 
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(A). 
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(B) (West 2018). 
152. Armstrong School Dist v. Armstrong Educ. Ass’n, 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1991), 
superseded by statute, 1992 Pa. Laws 403 No. 88, as recognized in Carroll v. Ringgold 
Educ. Ass’n, 655 A.2d 613 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). 
153. See id.; see also Armstrong Educ. Ass’n v. Armstrong School Dist., 542 A.2d 
1047,  (Pa Commw. Ct. 1988). 
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Education Association v. Jersey Shore Area School District154
upheld an injunction of an initially legal teachers’ strike, 
stressing that the strike threatened a loss of state subsidies to 
schools because it could cause a failure to comply with a 
statutory requirement of providing 180 days of instruction.155
Illustrating the difficulty of these cases, the decision prompted 
two separate dissents.156
In some states, unions who strike illegally can be denied 
any rights to “dues check-off” they have under a collective 
bargaining contract, at least for a certain amount of time.157
“Dues check-off” means that the employer will automatically 
deduct the dues individual members of union bargaining units 
owe to the union that represents them, and forward the money 
to their union.158 While the amount of dues employees owe 
unions is independent of whether dues check-off exists, unions 
obviously derive a benefit from this form of automatic deduction 
(as opposed to having to bill members individually). 
Some public-sector laws permit decertification of unions 
that strike illegally.159 As noted above, PATCO was decertified 
after its 1981 strike.160 Florida’s statute also specifies that 
decertification is a potential penalty for an illegal strike.161
A minority of states allow private parties who suffered 
damages because of an illegal public-sector strike to sue the 
striking union and strikers to recover those damages.162 For 
example, Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Association Local 
1262163 held that because a firefighters’ strike was illegal, the 
strikers owed a legal duty to property owners either not to strike 
154. Jersey Shore Area School Dist. v. Jersey Shore Educ. Ass’n, 548 A.2d 1202 (N.J. 
1988). 
155. Id. at 1207-08. 
156. See, id. at 1208-11. 
157. See.,e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.507(6)(a)(2) (2019); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(3)(f) 
(LexisNexis 2010); see also MTA Bus Co. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 820 
N.Y.S.2d 479 (2006) (applying N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(3)(f) dues forfeiture 
penalty). 
158. See Union Dues Checkoff as a Subject in Labor-Management Negotiations: Good 
Faith Bargaining and NLRB Remedies, 39(2) FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 300 (1970). 
159. See., e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.507(6)(a)(2) 
160. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 885; see also MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 
774. 
161. FLA. STAT. § 447.507(6)(a)(2); see also MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 774. 
162. See, e.g., Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Ass’n Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
163. Id. 
210 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20.2 
or to fight fires.164 Thus, strikers could be held individually 
liable for damages their breach of that duty caused.165 A 
majority of states have rejected this type of claim.166
The evidence on the effectiveness of sanctions is mixed.  
Some evidence suggests that harsher strike sanctions do inhibit 
strikes.167 The state of Michigan, for example, experienced fewer 
teacher strikes after the state amended its public-sector statute 
in the 1990s to enhance penalties for such strikes.168
On the other hand, studies have also shown that the best 
way to avoid public-sector strikes is to provide robust collective-
bargaining rights with effective processes for resolving 
bargaining impasses.169 In both Ohio and Illinois, the number of 
public-sector strikes decreased after each state passed a law 
making strikes (and in the case of Ohio, collective bargaining 
generally) legal for most public employees.170
It may seem counter-intuitive that legalizing an activity 
would decrease the rate of participation in that activity.  But, as 
the 2018 teachers’ strikes arguably demonstrate, strikes may be 
more likely when employees have no other option. In general, 
strikes are least likely to occur in jurisdictions that provide for 
compulsory, binding interest arbitration to resolve bargaining 
disputes.171
Also, as the recent teachers’ strikes have shown, legal rules 
are not the only determinative factor in the outcome of strikes.  
While the PATCO strike was a disaster for the union and the 
employees, under the very same federal law, eleven years 
earlier, in 1970, U.S. postal workers engaged in a major work 
164. Id. at 1081; see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891. 
165. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891. 
166. See, e.g. Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2, 513 N.E.2d 1002 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); White v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 42, 738 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987); Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1983) (all rejecting tort claims brought by private citizens against 
illegal strikers). 
167. See Martin Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 313, 328 n. 67 (1993) (citing studies regarding the relationship 
between strike legalization and strike incidence) . 
168. See Lawler, supra note 106 (“In 1994, [Michigan] Public Act 112 placed stricter 
prohibitions on public school employee strikes specifically. Since that time, 
strikes have become a rarity in the state.”)
169. See Malin, supra note 167, at 328 n. 67 (citing studies regarding the 
relationship between strike legalization and strike incidence). 
170. Malin, supra note 167, at 374-76. 
171. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 247. 
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stoppage with fairly positive results.172 Around 200,000 workers 
struck, and ultimately the strike was settled with the union 
receiving increased collective bargaining rights and a significant 
pay hike.173
VII. CONCLUSION: OPTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WITHOUT 
THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY OR STRIKE?
A. Modern Public Sector Labor Law Answers 
For employees who lack both the right to strike and the 
right to bargain collectively, there are no alternatives to strikes. 
Not surprisingly, employees in states who lack collective 
bargaining rights generally do worse, in terms of compensation, 
than similarly-situated employees in states with collective 
bargaining rights.174 Again, denying public employees collective 
bargaining rights violates international norms, as expressed in 
ILO rules.175 Indeed, denying many public employees the right to 
strike may also run afoul of ILO practices.176 The Committee on 
Freedom of Association of the ILO determined that the anti-
strike provisions of the New York public-sector labor law used 
against striking transit workers violate international norms.177
Providing public employees with access to binding interest 
arbitration as an alternative is more defensible, but the teachers 
who struck in the spring of 2018 did not have access to any 
alternative method of resolving bargaining impasses – they 
didn’t even have the right to bargain. 
What would a better option for teachers in states like those 
that experienced strikes in 2018 look like? One could imagine 
three alternatives. First, adopting the type of broad strike rights 
that exist for private-sector employees and for most public 
employees in comparable countries: no need to go through an 
array of impasse procedures before striking.  Second, extending 
172. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 243. 
173. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 243. 
174. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on 
the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 Cornell J.L. Pub. Pol’y 735 (comparing 
public employees’ robust collective bargaining rights in Illinois with public 
employees’ lack of collective bargaining rights in Virginia). 
175. Pope et al., supra note 112, at 3. 
176. Pope et al., supra note 112, at 3. 
177. Pope et al., supra note 112, at 7 n.26. 
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to such states the model used in U.S. states that permit some 
public employees to strike, which generally requires exhausting 
mediation and/or fact-finding before striking. Third, using 
interest arbitration instead of strikes as the final way to resolve 
bargaining impasses. 
Unions have traditionally argued in favor of maximizing 
strike rights.  Rationales for this position have ranged from the 
position that the right to strike is a fundamental right, to the 
idea that strikes are the most effective way to maximize the 
power of worker collective action.178 The problem with this 
position in this context is that given political realities, this 
option has essentially no chance of being adopted in the states 
that experienced the teacher strikes in 2018, or, realistically, in 
any significant number of states beyond those that currently 
allow strikes.  Further, if it were, given current political realities 
in the U.S., one could easily see the types of practices that have 
vitiated the practical power of strikes in the private sector used 
in the public sector: specifically, the use of permanent 
replacements. 
And yet, interest arbitration has downsides as well. 
Professor Martin Malin has argued in favor of the right to strike, 
as opposed to interest arbitration.179 He argues that fears of 
unions benefiting inordinately from a too-powerful strike 
weapon have not been borne out by experience; that interest 
arbitrators are too wedded to the status quo in fixing contract 
terms; and that interest arbitration awards do not necessarily 
reflect the importance of various issues to the parties.180
This author would choose the second option: using rules 
that permit strikes, but under more limited circumstances than 
in the private sector. In other words, adopt the rules used in 
states that permit some public employees to strike in all 
jurisdictions. At the time of this writing though, even that seems 
fairly unrealistic for the states in question. 
178. For a recent reiteration of these and other arguments, see Pope et al., supra 
note 112. 
179. See Malin, supra note 167, at 316-335. 
180. Malin, supra note 167, at 333-34. 
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B. The Scope of Bargaining Issues 
Even were public-school teachers to gain more robust 
bargaining rights, or even the right to strike legally, one final 
problem would remain.  Some of the issues the teachers struck 
over – pay, for example – are classic examples of issues that are 
negotiable, mandatory subjects of bargaining for teachers’ and 
other unions.181
Some of the issues involved in the strikes, however, involve 
issues that even the most robust public-sector labor laws do not 
require government bodies to negotiate: most significantly, levels 
of school funding.182 It seems even more unrealistic to expect the 
states that experienced the teachers’ strikes in 2018 to require 
or even tolerate unions regularly negotiating about that topic. 
Indeed, requiring employers to negotiate with unions on that 
topic raises a number of serious policy questions beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
Still, the teachers’ strikes of 2018 should teach even old 
hands in the field that unions are capable of surprising and 
impressive accomplishments.  Perhaps these strikes will be a 
spur to move from a checkered history to a different and brighter 
future. 
181. For a thorough discussion of the scope of bargaining rules in public-sector labor 
law, see HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 739-92. 
182. See, e.g., Erin Johansson, Collective Bargaining 101 (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.jwj.org/collective-bargaining-101; NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
Collective Bargaining (Section 8(d) & 8(b)(3)), https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/whats-law/unions/collective-bargaining-section-8d-8b3 (last visited June 11, 
2019); Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
in the States, 4-8 (Mar. 2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf
(all discussing subjects of collective bargaining agreements, without a single 
reference to school funding). 
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